Abstract-Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology has been promoting the development of Internet applications, like Video on Demand (VoD) and file sharing. However, under the traditional pricing mechanism, the fact that most P2P traffic flows among peers can dramatically decrease the profit of ISPs, who may take actions against P2P and impede the adoption of P2P-assisted applications. So far, there is no proper profit distribution mechanism to solve this problem. In this paper, we develop a mathematical framework to analyze such economic issues. Inspired by the idea from cooperative game theory, we propose a cooperative profit-distribution model based on Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), in which both eyeball ISPs and Peer-assisted Content Providers (PCPs) form coalitions and compute a fair Pareto point to determine profit distribution. Moreover, we design a fair and feasible mechanism for profit distribution within each coalition and give a model to discuss the potential competition among ISPs. We show that such a cooperative method not only guarantees the fair profit distribution among network participants, but also improves the economic efficiency of the network system; and the potential competition among ISPs will make the network more efficient. This paper systematically studies solutions to unbalanced profit distribution caused by P2P and presents a feasible cooperative method to increase and fairly distribute the profit.
Ç

INTRODUCTION
A S the foundation of many important Internet applications like Video on Demand (VoD) and file sharing, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) architecture makes a nontrivial contribution to the increase of the network traffic. A detailed introduction to the development of P2P is provided in Section 1.1 of the supplementary file which is available in the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi. ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TPDS.2013.267.
P2P's superiority to the traditional Client/Server (C/S) architecture has been demonstrated by lots of academic work [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] and many successful commercial systems (such as PPLive [9] , UUSee [10] , and PPStream [11] ). PPVA [6] is proposed for universal and transparent P2P acceleration. We believe more and more Content Providers (CPs) will adopt P2P technology.
However, under the traditional Internet pricing mechanism, free-riding P2P traffic causes unbalanced profit distribution between Peer-assisted CPs (PCPs) and eyeball Internet Service Providers (ISPs) [12] . Here, the eyeball ISPs specialize in delivery to end customers. As we know, many eyeball ISPs charge a flat price [13] , [14] , [15] . Then P2P traffic transfers the cost of content delivery from CPs to ISPs. As a result, the profit of CPs increases, while that of ISPs decreases. Unlike eyeball ISPs, transit ISPs [12] often charge eyeball ISPs based on exchanged traffic [16] and do not give P2P the chance of free riding. Thus, transit ISPs do not need to consider the problem discussed in this paper, and all ISPs refer to eyeball ISPs.
The content-based revenues of CPs significantly exceed the connectivity-based revenues of eyeball ISPs, and the free-riding of P2P traffic intensifies the unbalanced profit distribution, which will drive ISPs to take actions against free-riding P2P, including engineering [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] and pricing strategies [21] , [22] , [23] . But these actions will take customers away [14] . Another strategy is to charge volume-based rates instead of flat rates [14] , [22] . Actually, in recent years, the flat-rate billing has been mostly discarded by ISPs such as Comcast, AT&T, Verizon and T-Mobile [24] . As a result, ISP profits can be guaranteed at a reasonable level. However, P2P users have to pay for the increasing P2P traffic and P2P applications become less attractive. Consequently, the volume of P2P traffic will sharply decrease and PCP profit will fall down quickly.
The unbalanced profit distribution can finally impede the adoption of P2P technology, which consequently leads to the question: Can we find a profit-distribution model in which P2P technology can also benefit ISPs? This paper will give a positive answer to this question.
Inspired by the idea from cooperative game theory, we propose a cooperative profit-distribution model based on the concept of Nash bargaining [25] . In this model, ISPs and PCPs form two coalitions and cooperate to maximize their total profit by stimulating the consumption of P2P service, and fairly divide the profit. To guarantee stability, we also consider a proper mechanism for profit distribution within each coalition. The main contributions of this paper are listed as follows:
1. We build a mathematical framework to describe the multilateral interactions among ISPs, CPs and users in three possible non-cooperative states; 2. We propose a cooperative profit-distribution model in which P2P technology can fairly benefit both PCP and ISP coalitions; 3. We design a fair and feasible mechanism for profit distribution within each coalition and give examples to prove the effectiveness of the cooperative profitdistribution model; 4. We give a model to discuss the potential competition among ISPs and the effect of the competition on network traffic localization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first propose a network model in Section 2. Then, to compare the results between the non-cooperative game and the cooperative game, we discuss the non-cooperative interactions among ISPs, PCPs and users in Section 3, before proposing a cooperative profit distribution model in Section 4. Further, we present our mechanism for profit distribution within each coalition in Section 5 and discuss the potential competition among ISPs in Section 6. In Section 7, we discuss the related work, followed by our conclusion in Section 8.
NETWORK MODEL
The network model consists of three communities: ISP community, CP community and user community, which are denoted by M ISP , M CP , and M user , respectively. Their relationships are illustrated in Fig. 1 . In a practical network system, M ISP often charges M CP a bandwidth-based price (such as the 95-percentile billing for exploding bandwidth [16] ) and charges M user a flat price [15] , [26] . Moreover, M CP often charges M user based on its consumed traffic volume.
It is the precondition of our model that the ISPs and the CPs form their own coalitions. In Section 1.3 of the supplementary file available online, we provide additional analysis on the formation of the coalitions from the perspectives of homogeneous and heterogeneous interactions.
The CPs who can adopt P2P technology become PCPs,
CP , where M PCP is the set of PCPs, and M r CP consists of the CPs who cannot adopt P2P in their services. Table 2 in the supplemental file available online lists the notations in our model.
In the C/S network, all service contents flow from M CP to M user through M ISP 's network. Suppose the bandwidth bought by M CP is b CP , and that bought by M user is b user . For M CP and M user , their average bandwidth utilization rates are CP and user , respectively. Usually, CP is higher than user (CPs use bandwidth more efficiently). Let v be the traffic volume, so we have:
In the peer-assisted network, the service contents consist of two parts: the contents provided by M PCP and that provided by M r CP . The former is more complex because it comes from both M PCP and M user . Suppose the traffic of M PCP accounts for a proportion in the total traffic of M CP . Generally, the P2P contents provided by the servers of M PCP accounts for a small proportion and the rest will be provided by M user . Note that the value of is a statistical measurement of the percentage of the traffic delivered by servers. In this case, M PCP can reduce its bought bandwidth to a smaller value b Ã PCP , so as to reduce the cost and keep its bandwidth utilization rate at CP , while M user with fixed bandwidth at b user , will increase its bandwidth utilization rate to a higher value Ã user , which makes the link or path busier. We assume the emergence of P2P traffic will not impact the traffic of M r CP because the traditional services provided by M r CP such as web and email, have a low elasticity of demand and the consumption will not be affected by P2P applications. Then M r CP will keep its traffic at v cs ¼ b CP Á ð1 À Þ Á CP . We denote the amount of the user-side P2P upload traffic by v up , and then we have:
which means that user's demand for M PCP with a proportion is satisfied by the servers of the PCP, and the other 1 À proportion is satisfied by other user's upload. Then we can derive the user-side total traffic volume, which is generated by user's consumption of the contents from M PCP :
Similar to the case of C/S network, we have:
v up shows the extra burden on the users brought by P2P. We assume CP ! Ã user ! user because even if the emergence of P2P traffic increases user's bandwidth utilization rate, the CPs with professional technical team and cost saving mechanism can gain a higher one. Here, we assume 9 0, which means the server always provides contents and makes the equation meaningful.
NON-COOPERATIVE GAME MODEL
In this section, we will explore the multi-lateral economic relationships among ISPs, CPs and users with the analysis of two games, the strategy-chosen game between ISPs and CPs, and the two-stage price-decision game among ISPs, CPs and users. A detailed analysis of the relationship between these two games is presented in Section 4.1 of the supplementary file available online.
Strategy-Chosen Game
We use a dynamic game between M ISP and M CP to analyze their strategies on technology and pricing. As discussed in Sections 1 and 2, the CPs can choose between C/S networks and P2P-assisted networks, and the ISPs can choose to charge users flat rates or volume-based rates.
The game tree is shown in Fig. 2 . States 0, 1, and 2 refer to the possible market states determined by the strategies chosen by M ISP and M CP . U The payoffs of M ISP and M CP in each state are determined by the equilibrium of the two-stage pricedecision game in Section 3.2 and the values of the payoffs will determine the equilibrium of this strategy-chosen game.
Two-Stage Price-Decision Game
A three-player non-cooperative game can be used to characterize the interactions among M ISP , M CP and M user . We introduce M user because user's reactions are involved in the price decision of M ISP and M CP . The precondition for this game is that both M ISP and M CP have chosen their strategies, which have been discussed in Section 3.1. We analyze a twostage game to determine b user , the bandwidth requirement of M user , and the basic traffic usage v at equilibrium. We use backward induction to solve this game and obtain an initial equilibrium market state (State 0).
Game Formulation
We give an overview of the two-stage price-decision game in Fig. 3 to demonstrate the strategies of participants and the repeated game between M ISP and M CP . At the first stage, M ISP and M CP decide the prices through a noncooperative repeated game; at the second stage, M user makes the optimal traffic usage decision according to the prices set at the first stage.
Initially, M ISP charges M CP a bandwidth-based price p b and charges M user a flat price . In reality, the ISPs always expect to gain a higher (at least the same) unit bandwidth profit from users than from CPs. Thus, is set based on
where C ISP ðÁÞ is a composite cost function [27] . For M CP , p s is the unit service price and F ad ðÁÞ is a volumebased advertisement fee function. Then, its profit is
where C CP ðÁÞ is a volume-based cost function. E user ðvÞ denotes the utility of M user , who consumes contents with volume v. Then, the net utility is
In this C/S network, a three-player game can characterize the interactions. M ISP and M CP act as leaders to price M user , who acts as a follower to decide traffic usage. In addition, since M ISP and M CP jointly affect the resource usage of M user , between them starts a two-player noncooperative game.
According to backward induction in the leader-follower game, we first analyze the second stage, assuming that M ISP and M CP have set the prices at the first stage.
The Follower's Problem
Given p b and p s , M user will maximize the net utility in Eq. (6) . By solving the follower's problem, we can obtain the volume consumed by M user : which is M user 's optimal traffic usage decision within purchased capacity. According to the first order condition for Eq. (6) 
The Leaders' Problems
According to the follower's reaction, users will choose v ¼vðp b ; p s Þ to optimize their net utility. Then the leaders' problems become:
Afterward a two-player non-cooperative game between M ISP and M CP happens. M ISP and M CP take turns to optimize their own object U ISP and U CP by varying their own decision variable p b and p s , respectively, keeping that of the other player as a constant. The existence of NE for this multi-leader-follower game depends on the properties of each net utility function and the existence and the uniqueness of pure NE have been well proved for particular continuous games [28] .
Game Solution
Let ðp
According to the definition of NE, the solution turns out to be:
We have the following theorem on the simplified sufficient conditions of NE for this problem, and the proof can be found in Section 3 of the supplementary file available online. 
Then, it must satisfy the following two conditions:
This theorem provides a way to computing the NE of the game which represents the steady state of this network market (State 0). If E user ðvÞ, F ad ðvÞ and the cost of M ISP and M CP are known with satisfactory properties, we can derive the NE in closed-form directly from this theorem.
P2P-Involved Profit Computing Model
One important job of this paper is to measure and quantify P2P traffic's impact on the network market under traditional pricing mechanisms, which helps us analyze and predict potential changes to the market. For example, if P2P causes a seriously unfair profit distribution, a new charging way might be adopted to make up the deficiency. However, the decision will affect the profit of others since user demand internally determines the profit of both M ISP and M CP . In this subsection, we will give a detailed analysis on these issues.
Based on the results of Section 3.2.2, we first analyze the impact of P2P traffic on the profit or utilities of the participants when the pricing strategy remains unchanged, which we define as State 1. It is clear that M ISP will bear an increasingly large burden with the growth of P2P traffic since its profit is calculated based on Eq. (4). Therefore we illustrate an analysis of M ISP 's reactive behavior conditionally and study its corresponding state, i.e., State 2. Finally, we present a state transition graph to summarize these possible non-cooperative market states and their transition conditions.
State 1
In the peer-assisted network, we have assumed that v cs will not be impacted by the emergence of P2P traffic (i.e.,
Compared with C/S, P2P improves the experience of M user because users get contents more quickly by P2P. For example, the P2P video streaming system PPLive improves the viewing experience of users [3] . Let b E user be M user 's new utility for contents volume
cs , and we assume b E user ðvÞ 9 E user ðvÞ as long as v 9 v Ã cs (i.e., v p2p 9 0). Let aða 9 1Þ be the acceleration rate of P2P, and then we have b
We simply assume that a and satisfy a linear relationship, and we can get a ¼ 1 þ Remark 1. Intuitively, 1 À reflects P2P's power, and when it becomes larger, the performance of P2P service becomes better because of its distributed sharing nature. So we assume a increases in accordance with 1 À . PCPs' servers guarantee system stability, so they are generally indispensable (i.e., 9 0).
As we have discussed in Section 2,
. When v p2p e v p2p , the fee charged from M user will be kept at ¼ b user . Thus, the net utility of M user becomes:
Áuser ; otherwise.
Here, M user will decide v
cs based on our assumption) to maximize U user , i.e.,
Then, based on v S1 p2p , we can get U CP and U ISP as follows.
where
cs Þ ð0 G 1Þ to measure the cost reduced by P2P.
Accordingly, U ISP becomes:
State 2
For M ISP , a major reason for the profit loss is that it charges M user a flat price, which leads to P2P free-riding. To defeat such free-riders, one effective way is to turn flat pricing into volume-based pricing [14] , [22] , [23] . Similar to State 2, we adopt
as the volume-based price. Then, the net utility of M user becomes:
Similar to Eq. (11), M user chooses
to obtain the optimal traffic usage. Then the utilities of M ISP and M CP can be obtained. The calculation of U CP is similar to Eq. (12). Accordingly, U ISP becomes:
Non-Cooperative State Analysis
As shown in Fig. 4 , we summarize the state transition conditions among States 0, 1, and 2. Unlike the way we analyze dynamic games of complete information using game trees directly [29] , we summarize all the possible equilibrium states (i.e., Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibriums, SPNEs). The state transition here specifies that in practical networks, a proper NE may not be reached through analysis and prediction, but may be attained through several steps of state transitions. For example, as pricing strategies act as the long-term behaviors of M ISP , it cannot be dynamic and flexible. Thus, after the system passes through a long path (transforming among different states), it is likely to arrive at a reasonable NE finally.
Example and Analysis
We have discussed the derivations of the utilities in Table 1 . Compared with State 0, U CP increases by 80.31 percent, while U ISP decreases by 28.85 percent. Thus, motivated by profit increase, some CPs will adopt P2P. Then, the system will change from State 0 to State 1. After M ISP adopts volume-based pricing, U ISP increases by 120.66 percent, while U CP decreases by 29.42 percent. Motivated by profit increase, M ISP will charge M user a volume-based price instead of the flat price. Then, the system will change from State 1 to State 2. Since U S2 CP 9 U S0 CP , M PCP still benefits from P2P and will not take further actions against M ISP . Remark 2. Economically, the only condition for the system to change from State 0 to State 1 is that under the traditional pricing mechanism, U S1 CP 9 U S0 CP . According to Eqs. (6) and (10), it is easily proved that v 
TABLE 1 Utilities in Different States
cost cannot cover the reduced income), it may give up P2P due to the reduced profit. Then, the system will be forced to change from State 2 to State 0.
Analysis
As the game tree in Fig. 2 shows, the game starts from M CP 's decision of whether to adopt P2P technology or not. If M CP adopts P2P, the game then goes to M ISP 's decision of which pricing model will be used to charge M user , i.e., flat or volume-based. Once M ISP makes a choice, the game is over. Based on backward induction and the payoff results given in this example, we get (P2P-assisted, volume-based) as the SPNE, and the payoff vector is (5.0835, 3.5226). We can verify that it satisfies the conditions for State 2 to be the final state (i.e., T1 instead of T2 in Fig. 4) .
In a practical system, the pricing strategy lags behind the technology application, so U Fig. 6b) , the system will stop in State 2, otherwise it will change from State 2 to State 0 and finally stop in State 0. Therefore, according to the state transition conditions in Fig. 4 , we can conclude the conditions for each SPNE. Under a certain condition, each state could be a proper NE.
For different traffic profiles ð; Þ, we get the optimal traffic usage with ''flat'' and ''volume-based'' pricing strategies of M ISP based on Eqs. (11) and (15) . Then, according to Eqs. (12), (13) , and (16), we can correspondingly derive the net utilities of M ISP and M CP . Fig. 6 shows U ISP and U CP for different ð ¼ 0:3Þ. According to the conditions introduced in Fig. 4 
COOPERATIVE PROFIT-DISTRIBUTION MODEL
Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) [25] and the Shapley value [30] are both widely accepted solutions to profit distribution problems. Shapley value is more often used in multiplayer profit distribution such as the profit distribution problems among different types of ISPs [12] , [31] . In twoplayer profit distribution, NBS and the Shapley value are equivalent, but NBS can avoid the definition of character functions and is simpler to calculate. Therefore, we propose a cooperative profit distribution model based on the concept of NBS, in which eyeball ISPs and PCPs first form two coalitions to cooperatively maximize their total profit and then fairly distribute the profit.
According to our analysis in Section 3.3.1, in the peerassisted network, M user may use up its original bandwidth at a flat price without buying additional bandwidth at a volume-based price. Here, we consider the following cooperation: M PCP sells contents at a discount rate PCP and M ISP charges the extra bandwidth bought by M user at a discount rate ISP (0 PCP , ISP 1). Both of them try to incentivize M user to consume more contents and to buy more bandwidth for P2P services. As shown in Fig. 7, if ISP is large, v p2p will not increase even if PCP ¼ 0, which implies that without the cooperation of M ISP , M PCP cannot unilaterally incentivize M user to consume more P2P contents, and thus the total profit will not increase. For M PCP , besides the fee charged for its traffic volume v Á , some of its profit should be shared with M ISP .
In this cooperation, the net utility of M user becomes: Accordingly, U ISP will become:
otherwise.
> > < > > :
Also, U CP will become:
Here, between the cooperative group and M user starts a leader-follower game. The former changes ISP and PCP to maximize its total profit:
M user as the price taker changes v p2p to maximize U user :
for the cooperative group :
For all cases,
total . Thus,
is the corresponding Pareto boundary. Now, we are facing an important question: How can M ISP and M PCP choose a fair point on the Pareto boundary as their profit distribution? As discussed previously, without cooperation, their profit may reach one of the following points (see Fig. 4 ): ðU If no agreement can be reached, the starting point will be the outcome of the game. Then, according to the fairness concept of NBS, the fair profit distribution can be deduced by:
NBS satisfies the following four axioms [25] , [32] , [33] :
1. Invariant to equivalent utility representations; 2. Pareto optimality; 3. Independence of irrelevant alternatives; and 4. Symmetry.
By solving the above optimization problem, we can obtain a fair profit distribution:
Then, the profit that
CP . To better illustrate the cooperative profit maximization and distribution, we provide additional numerical analysis in Section 2.5.1 of the supplementary file available online. From Fig. 9 in the supplementary file available online, we can see that U ISP increases by more than 110 percent, and U CP increases by more than 70 percent, compared with the starting point.
Specifically, for ð; Þ ¼ ð0:6; 0:3Þ, the Nash bargaining between M ISP and M PCP is illustrated in Fig. 8 , from which we can see that the starting point is ðU is R ¼ 3:7449. Compared with the starting point, U ISP increases by 145.90 percent, and U CP increases by 90.92 percent. Thus, both M ISP and M PCP benefit a lot from this cooperation.
PROFIT DISTRIBUTION WITHIN EACH COALITION
From the discussion in Section 4, we can see that M PCP should assign some profit R to M ISP in the cooperation. In this section, we will propose a mechanism to determine profit distribution within each coalition.
To ensure the stability of each coalition, the profit distribution mechanism should guarantee the fairness. Before introducing such a mechanism, we first provide some definitions.
Suppose there are m ISPs and n PCPs. For the i-th PCP ð1 i nÞ, we define two traffic matrices: According to the network model in Section 2, the PCP traffic delivered by P2P accounts for 1 À proportion, and the rest is provided by PCP servers. Then, we have:
Thus, in M PCP , the amount of traffic volume generated by the i-th PCP accounts for:
Based on Eq. (21), it is clear that P n i¼1 ' i ¼ 1. For M ISP , its two aggregated traffic matrices are defined as:
Suppose T ¼ ðt j;k Þ mÂm and e T ¼ diagðt 1 ;t 2 ; . . . ;t m Þ. In the l-th ISP's network ð1 l mÞ, the amount of P2P traffic generated by M PCP on user side is:
v l and b l denote the total traffic volume on user side and the total bandwidth bought by all the users with a flat price, respectively. Note that
user . Then, we can verify that the amount of the C/S traffic volume is v l À $ l , and the free-riding P2P traffic volume is v l À b l Á user (where user is the bandwidth utilization rate assumed by M ISP when setting the flat price). According to the network model in Section 2, we have:
In addition, we can deduce that:
Thus, the l-th ISP's contribution to the free-riding of P2P traffic accounts for:
Based on Eq. (24), it is clear that P m l¼1 l ¼ 1. Consequently, we propose a fair and feasible profit distribution mechanism. For a given R, the profit that the i-th PCP should assign to M ISP is R Á ' i , and the profit that M ISP should assign to the l-th ISP is R Á l .
We analyze the proposed mechanism based on the example (introduced in Section 4) in Section 2.6 of the supplementary file available online. The implementation issues of the profit distribution mechanism are discussed in Section 4.2 of the supplementary file available online, where we also discuss the fairness and feasibility of the mechanism.
POTENTIAL COMPETITION AMONG ISPS
As discussed in Section 5, the profit distribution within M ISP is based on the P2P traffic proportion contributed by each ISP, which can be changed by specific strategies. Therefore, potential competitions exist among ISPs. Our analysis shows that although the competition does not change the profit of each ISP, it increases traffic localization rate.
Motivations and Possible Actions of ISPs
P2P technology significantly increases the traffic among ISPs and therefore increases the costs of ISPs, while the localization of P2P traffic will decrease the cost. Besides, the profit distribution mechanism within M ISP is based on the contribution made by each ISP to the total P2P traffic, which means that the ISP can increase its proportion by localizing its P2P traffic under the condition where other ISPs do not take this action.
Inspired by the idea about P4P [20] , ISPs can take actions to localize P2P traffic to gain more profit from the reduced cost and profit distribution. To promote P2P traffic localization, ISPs can deploy tiered pricing [34] to encourage users to adopt P4P applications, so as to decrease the amount of P2P traffic among ISPs.
Competition Analysis
We denote the l-th ISP's number of P2P users by S l and the average amount of downloaded traffic of each user by d. We consider the situation where there are three ISPs.
We define three situations:
. Situation 1: None of the ISPs takes the action of traffic localization. . Situation 2: ISP 1 takes the action of traffic localization, while ISP 2 and ISP 3 do not take this action. . Situation 3: All ISPs take the action of traffic localization.
In Situation 1, suppose that every user downloads contents uniformly from all P2P users in the three ISPs. Fig. 9a shows how the profit distribution proportions change with the P2P user scales in different ISPs. Suppose the P2P user scale of ISP 1 is 1. From Fig. 9a , we can conclude that the ISP with more P2P users will gain a larger proportion of the profit, which can be illustrated by Eq. (25) .
In Situation 2, only ISP 1 takes action for traffic localization. Table 2 shows the downloaded and uploaded amounts of P2P traffic of each ISP. We denote the amount of downloaded and uploaded P2P traffic of the l-th ISP by D l and U l , respectively. Then we have
In addition, based on Eq. (25), we have:
Afterwards, we can derive l from the downloaded and uploaded amounts of P2P traffic provided in Table 2 . Fig. 9b shows the profit distribution proportion of each ISP with different P2P user scales of ISP 2 and ISP 3. We can conclude that the ISP who takes action for traffic localization gains more profit and others gain less. Fig. 10 shows the growth rate of profit distribution proportion of ISP 1 with different P2P user scales of ISP 2 and ISP 3. The result shows that the ISP with a smaller scale will gain a higher growth rate in its profit distribution proportion. Therefore, this action is more appealing to small ISPs than to large ones.
In Situation 3, all the ISPs take action for traffic localization and each ISP has the same profit distribution proportion as in Situation 1.
Stable State after Competition
Motivated by its own profit increase, ISP 1 first takes the localization action. Because of the reduced profit, ISP 2 and ISP 3 will also take the same action, bringing the system to a stable state (Situation 3), because none of the ISPs can take further action to increase its own profit. Fig. 11 shows the transfer of ISP 1 among the three situations, supposing that the three ISPs have the same number of P2P users. The profit of ISP 1 in the stable situation remains the same with that in the original situation. However, P2P traffic localization rate increases from about 33 percent to 100 percent. Although the competition does not change the profit of each ISP, it makes a contribution to the healthy development of the network by increasing traffic localization rate.
RELATED WORK
The increasing free-riding P2P traffic generated by more and more P2P applications decreases the profit of eyeball ISPs. There are two types of strategies for ISPs to handle this problem.
One type belongs to the engineering scheme, which includes resistance to P2P by throttling, shaping, and blocking [14] , [17] , and cooperation with PCPs to efficiently manage P2P traffic [18] , [19] , [20] , [35] , [36] . The former impedes the progress of P2P and may lead to PCPs' countermeasures, such as encryption and dynamic ports; the latter involves legality and privacy issues.
Another type belongs to the economic scheme. He et al. [23] surveyed Internet pricing models and concluded that pricing acts as an important auxiliary to control traffic and to improve performance. Regarding this problem, one research direction is that ISPs change their pricing strategies [22] , [23] , such as proposing uplink pricing so as to provide differential pricing for P2P and regular users. More types of the relationships are also studied to provide a fine-grained perspective for more efficient pricing mechanisms. For example, two layers of relationships (ISP-users and ISP-ISP) are studied based on the non-cooperative game model in [32] and [33] .
More related work is presented in Section 5 of the supplementary file available online.
CONCLUSION
Under the traditional Internet pricing mechanism, freeriding P2P traffic causes an unbalanced profit distribution between PCPs and eyeball ISPs, which will drive eyeball ISPs to take action against P2P and can finally impede the wide adoption of P2P applications. This paper proposes a new cooperative profit-distribution model based on Nash bargaining, in which both eyeball ISPs and PCPs form coalitions and then cooperate to maximize their total profit. The fair profit distribution between the two coalitions is determined by NBS. To guarantee the stability of each coalition, a fair mechanism for profit distribution within each coalition has been designed. Such a cooperative profitdistribution method not only guarantees the fair profit distribution among network participants, but also improves the economic efficiency of the overall network system. Under this profit distribution mechanism, competition may occur among ISPs, which will promote the healthy development of the network environment by increasing traffic localization rate.
